This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Continuous Implementation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Marion Oury (HEC Paris)
Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics and CNRS)
Abstract

It is well-known that mechanism design literature makes many simplifying infor- mational assumptions in particular in terms of common knowledge of the environment among players. In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a social choice function is continuously implementable. More specif- ically, we say that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable if it is (partially) implementable for types in the model under study and it continues to be (partially) implementable for types "close" to this initial model. We ?rst show that if the model is of complete information a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable only if it satis?es Maskin?s monotonicity. We then extend this result to general incomplete information settings and show that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable only if it is fully implementable in iterative dominance. For ?nite mechanisms, this condition is also su¢ cient. We also discuss implications of this characterization for the virtual implementation approach.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/econpaper90.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Nancy Cotterman)
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0090.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0090

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Einstein Drive,Princeton, NJ 08540
Phone: 609-734-8250
Fax: 609-951-4457
Web page: http://www.sss.ias.edu/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Nancy Cotterman).

Related research
Keywords: High order beliefs; robust implementation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).

This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.