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Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results

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  • Lombardi, Michele
  • Yoshihara, Naoki

Abstract

This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially-honest agents, which presume that there is at least one individual in society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategy-space reductions. As a consequence, it shows that in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series CCES Discussion Paper Series with number 43.

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Length: 39 p.
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:ccesdp:43

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Related research

Keywords: Nash implementation; canonical-mechanisms; s-mechanisms; self-relevant mechanisms; partial-honesty; permissive results;

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References

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  1. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2012. "Natural implementation with partially hones agents," Research Memoranda 005, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October.
  4. Amartya Sen, 1996. "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1766, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Corchón, Luis C., . "An Experiment on Nash Implementation," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3502, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  6. Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu, 2001. "Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 427-444, June.
  7. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
  8. Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
  9. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  10. Roberto Serrano & Antonio Cabrales, 2007. "Implemetation In Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics," Working Papers wp2007_0708, CEMFI.
  11. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
  12. Eliaz, K., 1999. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Papers 21-99, Tel Aviv.
  13. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
  14. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2010. "A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction," Research Memoranda 023, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
  15. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato, 2009. "Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 171-179, February.
  16. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
  18. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
  19. Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2003. "Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction: Colin F. Camerer, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2003, p. 550, Price $65.00/[UK pound]42.95, ISBN 0-691-09039-4," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 717-720, December.
  20. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  21. Koray, Semih & Sertel, Murat, 1991. "A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation : B. Dutta and A. Sen, Review of economic studies 58 (1991), 121-128," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 620-620, November.
  22. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  23. Corchón, Luis C. & Herrero, C., . "A decent proposal," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3862, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  24. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  25. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
  26. Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu, 2002. "Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: applications," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 253-276, December.
  27. Yamato, Takehiko, 1992. "On nash implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 484-492, July.
  28. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 121-28, January.
  29. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
  30. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.
  31. Sjaak Hurkens & Navin Kartik, 2009. "Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 180-192, June.
  32. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
  33. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Nash implementation and the bargaining problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 333-351, September.
  34. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier, 2012. "Implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2012. "Natural implementation with partially hones agents," Research Memoranda 005, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
  2. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.

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