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Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction

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  • Michele Lombardi

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Abstract

Benoît and Ok (Games Econ Behav 64:51–67, 2008 ) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social choice correspondence (SCC) is Maskin’s monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism (Benoît-Ok’s Theorem). This paper fully identifies the class of weakly unanimous SCCs that are Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism endowed with Saijo’s message space specification (Saijo in Econometrica 56:693–700, 1988 ). It is shown that this class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of SCCs that are Nash-implementable via Benoît-Ok’s Theorem. Copyright The Author(s) 2012

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-012-0117-7
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 16 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 297-309

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:16:y:2012:i:4:p:297-309

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Related research

Keywords: Nash implementation; Strategy space reduction; Informational efficiency; Simple stochastic mechanisms; C72; D71;

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References

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  1. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Yamato, Takehiko, 1992. "On nash implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 484-492, July.
  4. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
  5. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
  6. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
  7. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2010. "A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction," Research Memorandum 023, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  8. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2013. "A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 131-151, September.

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