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Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium

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Author Info
Claudio Mezzetti
Ludovic Renou ()

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Abstract

A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition of Nash implementation in that it does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium. We show that the condition of weak set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskin’s monotonicity, is necessary for implementation. We provide sufficient conditions for implementation and show that important social choice correspondences that are not Maskin monotonic can be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 09/10.

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Date of creation: Apr 2009
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Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:09/10

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Related research
Keywords: implementation; Maskin monotonicity; pure and mixed Nash equilibrium; weak set-monotonicity; social choice correspondence;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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  1. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1987. "On constant maskin monotonic social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 382-386, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 111-125, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(1), pages 121-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 857-871, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


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