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Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

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  • Lombardi, Michele
  • Yoshihara, Naoki

Abstract

Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48234.

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Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision: 11 Jul 2013
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48234

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Keywords: Implementation; Nash equilibrium; social choice correspondences; partial honesty; Condition μ*.;

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References

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  1. Tadenuma, Koichi & Toda, Manabu, 1998. "Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 121-132, March.
  2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
  3. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October.
  5. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Nash implementation and the bargaining problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 333-351, September.
  6. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  7. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
  8. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  10. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
  11. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
  12. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2010. "A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction," Research Memorandum 023, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  13. Kara, Tarik & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Nash Implementation of Matching Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 425-439, February.
  14. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  15. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-518, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  16. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 121-28, January.
  17. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier, 2012. "Implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  18. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University 592, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

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