Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
AbstractWe incorporate behavioral economics into implementation theory, where each agent dislikes telling a white lie. By using a single detail-free mechanism, any alternative can be uniquely implemented as long as the agents regard this alternative as being socially desirable.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 100 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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