Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory
AbstractThis paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest. We present a permissive result wherein by using just a single detail-free mechanism, any alternative can be uniquely implemented in iterative dominance as long as the agents regard this alternative as being socially desirable.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-523.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033
Web page: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index.html
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-11-03 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2007-11-03 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-11-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2007-11-03 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Abreu, D. & Matsushima, H., 1991.
"Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information,"
e-91-2, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
- Abreu, D. & Matsushima, H., 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information," Working Papers e-91-1, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- Eliaz, K., 1999.
"Fault Tolerant Implementation,"
21-99, Tel Aviv.
- Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
- Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi, 1994. "Exact Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, October.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
- Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012.
"Mechanism design and intentions,"
ECON - Working Papers
066, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Aug 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012.
"Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation,"
CIRJE-F-870, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.
- Ville Korpela, 2012. "Implementation without rationality assumptions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 189-203, February.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-15, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Ronen Gradwohl, 2013. "Privacy in Implementation," Discussion Papers 1561, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CIRJE administrative office).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.