This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Abreu, Dilip
Sen, Arunava

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Consider a social choice correspondence as a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over some finite set of alternatives. A virtually implementable social choice function in Nash equilibrium is defined, under mild domain restrictions it is shown that in societies with at least three individuals all social choice correspondences are virtually implementable in Nash equilibrium. This contrasts with Maskin's classic characterization, which requires monotonicity as a necessary condition for exact implementation in Nash equilibrium. The two person case is considered seperately. While not all two-person social choice functions are virtually implementable, our necessary and sufficient condition is simple, which contrasts with the complex necessary and sufficient conditions for exact implementation. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199107%2959%3A4%3C997%3AVIINE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 59 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 997-1021
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:4:p:997-1021

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. BOCHET, Olivier & MANIQUET, Franois, 2006. "Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support," CORE Discussion Papers 2006084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Implementation and Preference for Honesty," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-244, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 353-367, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  6. Chambers, Christopher P., 2003. "Virtual Repeated Implementation," Working Papers 1179, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Anirban Kar, Indrajit Ray and Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Aggregation of Expert Opinions," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 902, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  11. Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2009. "On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibria," Working Papers 2009-ECO-06, IESEG School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  12. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-149, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  16. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0028, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal & Neil Wallace, 2006. "The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model," Working Paper 0615, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Ashraf-Ball, Hezlin & Oswald, Andrew J. & Oswald, James I., 2009. "Hydrogen Transport and the Spatial Requirements of Renewable Energy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 903, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-148, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  20. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1999. "On the Impossibility of Implementation under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 99-10, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised 1999. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.