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Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies

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Author Info
Palfrey, Thomas R
Srivastava, Sanjay
Abstract

The authors study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences via Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy. The main result is that if there are at least three agents in society, then any correspondence that satisfies no veto power is implementable unless some agents are completely indifferent over all possible outcomes. Many common welfare criteria, such as the Pareto correspondence, and several familiar voting rules satisfy the authors' conditions. This possibility result stands in sharp contrast to the more restrictive findings with implementation in either Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect equilibrium Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 59 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 479-501
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:2:p:479-501

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  1. Luis Corchón & Bhaskar Chakravorti & Simon Wilkie, 1993. "Credible Implementation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sang-Chul Suh, 1994. "A mechanism implementing the proportional solution," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 301-317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  4. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 902, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  6. Anke Gerber & Philipp C. Wichardt, 2008. "Providing Public Goods in the Absence of Strong Institutions," IEW - Working Papers iewwp303, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  7. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001. "Implementation with Near-Complete Information," Discussion Papers 1332, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Luis Corchon & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin, 1994. "Robust implementation under alternative information structures," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 159-171, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Ashraf-Ball, Hezlin & Oswald, Andrew J. & Oswald, James I., 2009. "Hydrogen Transport and the Spatial Requirements of Renewable Energy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 903, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra, 2005. "Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth," Microeconomics 0504008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  17. Eric S. Maskin, 2008. "Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals," Economics Working Papers 0081, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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