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Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Matthew O. Jackson
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We study social choice correspondences which can be implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms. (An undominated Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy. A mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by an undominated strategy). We provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation. Our conditions are satisfied in virtually all "economic" settings, and are also satisfied by many interesting correspondences identified in the social choice literature. For economic settings, we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism in which the undominated Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number
966.
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Date of creation: Aug 1990Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:966Contact details of provider: Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014 Phone: 847/491-3527 Fax: 847/491-2530 Email: Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/ More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Moulin, Herve, 1979.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989.
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Jackson, Matthew O, 1991.
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Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975.
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Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987.
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Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991.
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Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1990.
"Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms ,"
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Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988.
"Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation ,"
Econometrica ,
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Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989.
"Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms ,"
Discussion Papers
833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991.
"Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium ,"
Econometrica ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992.
"Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information ,"
Econometrica ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Abreu, D. & Matsushima, H., 1991.
"Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information ,"
Papers
e-91-2, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
Abreu, D. & Matsushima, H., 1991.
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e-91-1, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Luis C. Corchon, 2007.
"The theory of implementation : what did we learn? ,"
Economics Working Papers
we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Takashi Kunimoto, 2006.
"The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium ,"
Departmental Working Papers
2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997.
"Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining ,"
Game Theory and Information
9711003, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Walter Trockel, 1999.
"On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
788, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Matthew O. Jackson & Sanjay Srivastava, 1992.
"Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems ,"
Discussion Papers
1004, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Olivier, BOCHET & Franois, MANIQUET, 2006.
"Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support ,"
Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper
2006043, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
[Downloadable!]
Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2008.
"Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons ,"
Review of Economic Design ,
Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 253-270, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2006.
"Triple Implementation by Sharing Mechanisms in Production Economies with Unequal Labor Skill ,"
Discussion Paper Series
a475, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Walter Trockel, 1999.
"Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
787, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Hannu Vartiainen, 2007.
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Social Choice and Welfare ,
Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 353-367, October.
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Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2001.
"Implementation with Near-Complete Information ,"
Discussion Papers
1332, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Antonio Cabrales, 1996.
"Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information ,"
Economics Working Papers
179, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Antonio Cabrales, .
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ELSE working papers
009, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
[Downloadable!] Cabrales, Antonio, 1999.
"Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002.
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Discussion Papers
0102-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000.
"Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics ,"
Review of Economic Dynamics ,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, .
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ELSE working papers
057, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
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"Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics ,"
Economics Working Papers
221, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!] Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, .
"Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
6-98, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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2000-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
[Downloadable!] Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, .
"Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
6-98, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
Roberto Serrano, 2003.
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Working Papers
2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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"Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth ,"
Microeconomics
0504008, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Mario Gilli, 2002.
"Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory ,"
Working Papers
47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
[Downloadable!]
Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001.
"Implementation Theory ,"
Working Papers
5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001.
"Implementation Theory ,"
Economics Working Papers
0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!] Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
"Implementation theory ,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare ,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2004.
"Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics and Business
04-03-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Mar 2005.
[Downloadable!]
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