Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions in Production Economies with Unequal Skills
AbstractIn production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. Instead of Consistency of Resource Allocation across Dimension (CONRAD)[Roemer (1986, 1988)], which is essentially equivalent to the axiom of Welrfarism [Roemer (1988)], we introduce a weaker axiom, Consistency w.r.t. Technological Innovations (CTI), so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions)from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dwokin (1981, 1981a).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a396.
Date of creation: Oct 2000
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Yoshihara, Naoki, 2003. "Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 256-285, February.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
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