We provide three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims that are not necessarily convex. One characterization result is obtained by using, together with other standard axioms, two solidarity axioms. Another characterization theorem shows that the single-valuedness axiom is dispensable even within the class of nonconvex problems if the standard symmetry axiom is imposed.
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Paper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
632.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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