Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Endogenous bargaining power

Contents:

Author Info

  • Joan Esteban
  • József Sákovics

Abstract

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom based on individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limit of a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a function of the parties’ relative power. We examine the connection between ASC and asymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power of the parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF that would select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/644.pdf
File Function: Whole Paper
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 644.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:644

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

Related research

Keywords: Bargaining; conflict; disagreement;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  2. Chen, Mark A. & Maskin, Eric S., 1999. "Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 140-147, November.
  3. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
  4. Powell, Robert, 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 255-289, August.
  5. Barry O'Neill & Dov Samet & Zvi Wiener & Eyal Winter, 2001. "Bargaining with an Agenda," Game Theory and Information 0110004, EconWPA.
  6. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  7. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999. "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 379-415, August.
  8. Svejnar, J., 1984. "Bargaining power, fear of disagreement and wage settlements: theory and evidence from U.S. industry," CORE Discussion Papers 1984037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
  10. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  11. Ehud Kalai, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Discussion Papers 179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  13. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
  14. Roemer, John E., 1988. "Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-31, June.
  15. Clara Ponsati & Joel Watson, 1998. "Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 501-524.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Omonbude, Ekpen J., 2007. "The transit oil and gas pipeline and the role of bargaining: A non-technical discussion," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6188-6194, December.
  2. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process: Theory and Empirical Evidence," ESE Discussion Papers 129, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  3. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "The use of conflict as a bargaining tool against unsophisticated opponents," ESE Discussion Papers 99, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:644

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.