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A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Joan Esteban
József Sákovics ()
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision .
Volume (Year): 65 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 227-252
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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:65:y:2008:i:3:p:227-252Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
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Keywords: bargaining ; conflict ; disagreement ; C78 ; D74 ; References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Other versions: Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993.
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Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991.
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Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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Anbarci, Nejat & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2002.
"Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
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Other versions: Z. A. Spindler, 1974.
"Endogenous Bargaining Power in Bilateral Monopoly and Bilateral Exchange ,"
Canadian Journal of Economics ,
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Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999.
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Econometrica ,
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Roemer, John E., 1988.
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Jozsef Sakovics, 2004.
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ESE Discussion Papers
98, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
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Other versions: O'Neill, Barry & Samet, Dov & Wiener, Zvi & Winter, Eyal, 2004.
"Bargaining with an agenda ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 139-153, July.
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Other versions: Kalai, Ehud, 1977.
"Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-30, October.
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Other versions: Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1998.
"Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction ,"
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Grossman, Herschel I, 1991.
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Becker, Gary S, 1983.
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The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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Horowitz, Andrew W, 1993.
"Time Paths of Land Reform: A Theoretical Model of Reform Dynamics ,"
American Economic Review ,
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