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Economics of Conflict: An Overview

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Author Info
Garfinkel, Michelle R.
Skaperdas, Stergios

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Abstract

In this chapter, we review the recent literature on conflict and appropriation. Allowing for the possibility of conflict, which amounts to recognizing the possibility that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced, represents a significant departure from the traditional paradigm of economics. The research we emphasize, however, takes an economic perspective. Specifically, it applies conventional optimization techniques and game-theoretic tools to study the allocation of resources among competing activities - productive and otherwise appropriative, such as grabbing the product and wealth of others as well as defending one's own product and wealth. In contrast to other economic activities in which inputs are combined cooperatively through production functions, the inputs to appropriation are combined adversarially through technologies of conflict. A central objective of this research is to identify the effects of conflict on economic outcomes: the determinants of the distribution of output (or power) and how an individual party's share can be inversely related to its marginal productivity; when settlement in the shadow of conflict and when open conflict can be expected to occur, with longer time horizons capable of inducing conflict instead of settlement; how conflict and appropriation can reduce the appeal of trade; the determinants of alliance formation and the importance of intra-alliance commitments; how dynamic incentives for capital accumulation and innovation are distorted in the presence of conflict; and the role of governance in conflict management.

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This chapter was published in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.) , Elsevier, chapter 22, pages 649-709, 2007.

This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Defense Economics with number 2-22.

Handle: RePEc:eee:hdechp:2-22

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Related research
This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 1. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Keywords: Defense in a Globalized World

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

Cited by:
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  1. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 657-676, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II)," MPRA Paper 1438, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 723.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Raul Caruso, 2007. "Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(17), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests," ESE Discussion Papers 158, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  6. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "A Tentative Model of Conflict, Appropriation and Production in a two-sector Economy," MPRA Paper 4053, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Birendra K. Rai & Rajiv Sarin, 2007. "Parametric Contest Success Functions," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-010, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stergios Skaperdas, 2007. "An Economic Approach to Analyzing Civil War," Working Papers 060715, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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