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Information in conflicts

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  • Wärneryd, Karl

Abstract

We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of a prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent. -- Der Autor untersucht einen Wettbewerb mit zwei Spielern um einen Gewinn von allgemeinem, jedoch unbekanntem Wert. Er zeigt, daß im Vergleich zu einer Situation in der beide oder keiner von beiden Akteuren die Höhe des Gewinns kennen, weniger Ressourcen im Gleichgewicht verwendet werden, als in dem Fall in dem einer der beiden Spieler über die Höhe des Gewinns informiert ist. Des weiteren ist es ex ante streng genommen wahrscheinlicher, daß der uninformierte Spieler den Gewinn erhält und nicht der informierte.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance with number FS IV 01-11.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0111

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Keywords: Conflict; contest; asymmetric information; all-pay auction;

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  1. Antonio Bernardo & Eric L. Talley & Ivo Welch, 1999. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management ysm118, Yale School of Management.
  2. Laband, David N & Sophocleus, John P, 1992. "An Estimate of Resource Expenditures on Transfer Activity in the United States," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 959-83, August.
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  5. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
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  9. Wärneryd, Karl, 1997. "Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 173, Stockholm School of Economics.
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  12. Eliakim Katz & Jacob Rosenberg, 1989. "Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation: Preliminary results for 20 countries," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 133-144, February.
  13. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 195-210, June.
  14. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
  15. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  16. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  17. Linster, Bruce G, 1993. " Stackelberg Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 307-21, October.
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