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An Estimate of Resource Expenditures on Transfer Activity in the United States

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  • David N. Laband
  • John P. Sophocleus

Abstract

This paper details resource expenditures on nonexchange, noncharity transfer activity in the United States in 1985. Expenditures designed to facilitate and inhibit nonexchange transfers, executed privately or through the state, are reported. The numbers indicate that individuals plausibly invested nearly a trillion dollars in transfer activity that year. Nominal GNP in 1985 was just over $4 trillion, which includes numerous transfer-related resource investments that arguably should be subtracted out. Transfer activity thus apparently constitutes a much larger fraction of all economic activity conducted in the United States than previously recognized.

Suggested Citation

  • David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, 1992. "An Estimate of Resource Expenditures on Transfer Activity in the United States," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 959-983.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:107:y:1992:i:3:p:959-983.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2118370
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    Cited by:

    1. Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 43-77.
    2. Roger D. Congleton, 2018. "Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 229-244, June.
    3. Fernando del Río, 2021. "The impact of rent seeking on social infrastructure and productivity," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 1741-1760, August.
    4. repec:elg:eechap:15325_3 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Persuasion as a contest," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 465-486, October.
    6. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent seeking and the excess burden of taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 158-167.
    7. Lott, John R, Jr, 2000. "A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-393, October.
    8. Yogesh Uppal, 2011. "Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 189-207, April.
    9. Sheremeta, Roman, 2016. "Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests," MPRA Paper 73731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. repec:elg:eechap:15325_1 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent Seeking and the Excess Burden of Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 8160, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Richard L. Carson, 2009. "Rent Seeking and Inclusiveness," Carleton Economic Papers 09-05, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 19 Dec 2016.
    13. Warneryd, Karl, 2003. "Information in conflicts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 121-136, May.
    14. Rowley, Charles K., 2000. "Political culture and economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 133-158, March.
    15. David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, 2019. "Measuring rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 49-69, October.
    16. Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
    17. Vitor Melo & Stephen Miller, 2022. "Estimating the Effect of Rent-Seeking on income distribution: an analysis of U.S. States and Counties," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 99-114, July.
    18. repec:elg:eechap:15325_2 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
    20. Richard L. Carson, 2009. "The Effect of Rent Seeking on Economics Growth," Carleton Economic Papers 09-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 19 Dec 2016.
    21. Angelopoulos, Konstantinos & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2009. "The social cost of rent seeking in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 280-299, September.
    22. Josten, Stefan Dietrich, 2003. "Inequality, Crime and Economic Growth: A Classical Argument for Distributional Equality," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(4), pages 435-452, August.
    23. Vitor Melo & Elijah Neilson, 2023. "Introducing an index of rent seeking: a synthetic matching approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(3), pages 471-487, December.
    24. Ana Rodríguez-Álvarez & Ignacio Rosal & José Baños-Pino, 2007. "The cost of strikes in the Spanish mining sector: modelling an undesirable input with a distance function," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 73-83, February.
    25. Ann Dryden Witte & Robert Witt, 2001. "What We Spend and What We Get: Public and Private Provision of Crime Prevention," NBER Working Papers 8204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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