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The economic theory of rent seeking

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  • Robert Tollison

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-011-9852-5
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 152 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 73-82

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:152:y:2012:i:1:p:73-82

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords: Rent seeking; Social costs; Monopolies; Tariffs; Crime;

References

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  1. Buchanan, James M, 1983. "Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 71-85, April.
  2. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
  3. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990. "The Allocation of Talent: Implicationsfor Growth," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 65, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  4. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  5. Dougan, William R & Snyder, James M, 1993. " Are Rents Fully Dissipated?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 793-813, December.
  6. Laband, David N & Sophocleus, John P, 1992. "An Estimate of Resource Expenditures on Transfer Activity in the United States," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 959-83, August.
  7. George J. Stigler, 1974. "Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 359-365, Autumn.
  8. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  9. Tollison, Robert D & Wagner, Richard E, 1991. "Romance, Realism, and Economic Reform," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 57-70.
  10. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marcus DEJARDIN, 2001. "Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth: An Obvious Conjunction?," Development and Comp Systems 0110010, EconWPA.
  2. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2007. "Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 199-229, October.
  3. Bruno S. Frey, . "Knight Fever towards an Economics of Awards," IEW - Working Papers 239, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  4. Per Fredriksson, 2001. "How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 65-85, April.
  5. Antoine Gentier & Giuseppina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2006. "The Question of the Rent Dissipation in the Notes Issuance Activity: The Case of the Italian Banking System before the Creation of the Bank of Italy," CAE Working Papers 45, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
  6. Shinnick, Edward, 2003. "Aspects of Regulatory Reform in the Irish Solicitor Profession: Review & Evaluation," Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Articles, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), vol. 2003(2-Summer), pages 1-15.
  7. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi, 2009. "Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 171-196, April.
  8. Giovanni B. Ramello, 2004. "Pelle sub agnina latitat mens saepe lupina. Copyright in the marketplace," LIUC Papers in Economics 141, Cattaneo University (LIUC).
  9. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September.
  10. Antoine Gentier & Giuseppina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2011. "Rent Dissipation or Government Predation? The Notes Issuance Activity in Italy 1865-1882," CAE Working Papers 88, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
  11. Boggess, William G., 1995. "The Poverty Of Applied Policy Analysis," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 27(01), July.
  12. Charles DeLorme & Stacey Isom & David Kamerschen, 2005. "Rent seeking and taxation in the Ancient Roman Empire," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(6), pages 705-711.
  13. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, . "Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?," IEW - Working Papers 166, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  14. Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Thomas Osang, 2004. "Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 279-308, February.
  15. Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Muthukumara Mani, 2004. "The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 363-390, February.

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