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Persuasion as a Contest

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Abstract

We examine how the probability of persuading an audience depends on resources expended by contending parties. We use a Bayesian approach whereby the audience makes inferences solely based on the evidence produced by the constants. We find conditions that yield the well-known additive contest success functions, including the logit function. We also find conditions that produce a generalized "difference" functional form. In all cases, there are three main determinants of audience choice: (i) the truth and other objective parameters of the environment; (ii) the biases of the audience; and (iii) the resources expended by the interested parties.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance in its series Economics Series with number 2008_07.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 16 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2008_07

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Keywords: rent-seeking; advertising; litigation; political campaigning; property rights;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Corchon, Luis, 2009. "Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit," MPRA Paper 18761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2012. "The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 7031, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Kai Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2012. "Introduction," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 241-245, October.
  4. Denter, Philipp, 2013. "A theory of communication in political campaigns," Economics Working Paper Series 1302, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  5. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
  6. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2014. "Difference-form group contests," Working Papers 2014/6, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  7. Enrico Spolaore, 2008. "Civil conflict and secessions," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 45-63, January.
  8. Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Technologies of Conflict," Working Papers 101111, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  9. Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013. "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
  10. Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas & Pi-Han Tsai, 2014. "Why Go to Court? Bargaining Failure under the Shadow of Trial with Complete Information," Working Papers 131406, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  11. Ian A. MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2014. "Coasean Bargaining in the Presence of Pigouvian Taxation: Revisiting the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem," Discussion Papers Series 515, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  12. Gerry Antioch, 2013. "Persuasion is now 30 per cent of US GDP," Economic Roundup, Treasury, Australian Government, issue 1, pages 1-10, April.

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