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Group contest success functions

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  • Johannes Münster

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-009-0479-4
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 41 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 (November)
    Pages: 345-357

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:41:y:2009:i:2:p:345-357

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    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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    Related research

    Keywords: Contest; Conflict; Axiom; Group; C70; D72; D74;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Birendra Rai & Rajiv Sarin, 2009. "Generalized contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 139-149, July.
    2. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
    3. Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Post-Print halshs-00160753, HAL.
    4. Caruso, Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes,(The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," MPRA Paper 214, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2006.
    5. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    6. Roman Inderst & Holger Müller & Karl Wärneryd, 2005. "Influence costs and hierarchy," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-197, 07.
    7. Wärneryd, Karl, 1997. "Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 173, Stockholm School of Economics.
    8. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu & Na, Sunghyun, 2001. "Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 415-429, December.
    9. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1991. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 130-34, May.
    10. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-17, February.
    11. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "Stable Alliance Formation in Distributional Conflict," Public Economics 0305001, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2003.
    12. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    13. Cornes, Richard, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 259-71, February.
    14. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Public Economics 0312005, EconWPA, revised 04 Mar 2004.
    15. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
    16. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
    17. Kyung Baik, 2008. "Contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 103-117, January.
    18. Gil S. Epstein & Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Lobbying contests with alternative instruments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 81-89, 04.
    19. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.
    20. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
    21. Katz, Eliakim & Tokatlidu, Julia, 1996. "Group competition for rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 599-607, December.
    22. David Malueg & Andrew Yates, 2006. "Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 719-727, 04.
    23. Ron Siegel, 2009. "All-Pay Contests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 71-92, 01.
    24. Inderst, Roman & Muller, Holger M. & Warneryd, Karl, 2007. "Distributional conflict in organizations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 385-402, February.
    25. Hao Jia, 2008. "A stochastic derivation of the ratio form of contest success functions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 125-130, June.
    26. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Politics of Randomness," CESifo Working Paper Series 803, CESifo Group Munich.
    27. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November.
    28. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1998. " On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 25-42, July.
    29. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Cubel, Maria & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2012. "The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat," NEPS Working Papers 4/2012, Network of European Peace Scientists.
    2. Corchón, Luis & Dahm, Matthias, 2011. "Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 309-317.
    3. Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Technologies of Conflict," Working Papers 101111, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    4. Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "Direct and Structural Discrimination in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4518, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012. "Differential Prize Taxation and Structural Discrimination in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 3831, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. André De Palma & Soumyanetra Munshi, 2012. "Multi-player, Multi-prize, Imperfectly Discriminating Contests," Working Papers hal-00683688, HAL.

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