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Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods

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Author Info
 Katz, Eliakim
Nitzan, Shmuel
Rosenberg, Jacob

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 65 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 49-60
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:65:y:1990:i:1:p:49-60

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  1. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests," ESE Discussion Papers 158, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Papers 100, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Anna Gunnthorsdottir & Amnon Rapoport, 2003. "The effect of sharing rules on group competition," Experimental 0307003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2004. "Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized system," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 75-76, pages 20, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
  5. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2005. "Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2005.16, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse27_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2003. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U. S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Vienna Economics Papers 0315, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2009. "Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 357-369, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Cheikbossian, G., 2004. "Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2004.12, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
  10. Luis Corchón, 2007. "The theory of contests: a survey," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Uwe Dulleck & Paul Frijters & Konrad Podczeck, 2006. "All-pay Auctions with Budget Constraints and Fair Insurance," Vienna Economics Papers 0605, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "A rationale for the coexistence of central and decentral marketing in team sports," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse4_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "The Stability Of Anarchy And Breakdown Of Production," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 589-603, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kyung Baik, 2008. "Contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 103-117, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Khalid Riaz & Jason F. Shogren & Stanley R. Johnson, 1992. "Contests with Endogenously Valued Prizes: The Case of Pure Public Goods," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 92-wp86, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
  17. Wolfgang Leininger, 2002. "Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  18. Dieter Boes, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  19. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997. "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," CORE Discussion Papers 1997077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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