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Stable alliance formation in distributional conflict

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  • Garfinkel, Michelle R.

Abstract

This paper develops a positive analysis of alliance formation that builds on a simple economic model featuring a “winner-take-all” contest for control of some resource. When an alliance forms, members pool their efforts in that contest and,if successful, apply the resource to a joint production process. The analysis does not assume that the alliance has some special advantage in the conflict or that the joint production process exhibits increasing returns. Nor is there any presumption that peace prevails among the alliance members. In this setting, the analysis finds that, due to the familiar free-rider problem, the formation of alliances tends to reduce the severity of the conflict over the contestable resource. Furthermore, despite the internal conflict that arises among the winning alliance’s members over the distribution of their joint product, under reasonable conditions this effect alone is sufficient to support stable alliance formation in a noncooperative equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 20 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 829-852

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:4:p:829-852

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Enrico Spolaore, 2012. "The Economics of Political Borders," CESifo Working Paper Series 3854, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Joan Mª Esteban & József Sákovics, 2003. "Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict," Working Papers 3, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Indranil Dutta & Ajit Mishra, 2010. "Does Inequality lead to Conflict?," Working Papers id:3246, eSocialSciences.
  4. Enrico Spolaore, 2009. "National Borders, Conflict and Peace," NBER Working Papers 15560, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
  6. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
  7. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
    [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION O    ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2007. "Endogenous coalition formation in contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 139-163, September.
  9. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 251-276, June.
  10. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2012. "How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 579-594, March.
  11. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Public Economics 0312005, EconWPA, revised 04 Mar 2004.
  12. Estrada G., Fernando, 2011. "The logic of the violence in the civil war: The armed conflict in Colombia," PERFIL DE COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA, UNIVERSIDAD DE ANTIOQUIA - CIE.
  13. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November.
  14. Francis Bloch, 2009. "Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts," Working Papers hal-00435387, HAL.
  15. Estrada, Fernando, 2011. "Heuristic Schelling: economy of organized crime," MPRA Paper 31306, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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