This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Coalitions, Agreements and Efficiency

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Effrosyni Diamantoudi
Licun Xue () (Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Denmark)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

If agents negotiate openly and form coalitions, can they reach efficient agreements? We address this issue within a class of coalition formation games with externalities where agents' preferences depend solely on the coalition structures they are associated with. We derive Ray and Vohra's (1997) notion of equilibrium binding agreements using von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable set and then extend it to allow for arbitrary coalitional deviations (as opposed to nested deviations assumed originally). We show that, while the new notion facilitates the attainment of efficient agreements, inefficient agreements can nevertheless arise

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://ftp.econ.au.dk/afn/wp/02/wp02_9.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2002-9.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 23
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2002-9

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.au.dk/afn/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Coalition formation externalities efficiency agreements

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Parkash Chander, 2004. "The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 108, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting," Working Papers 06.01, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Funaki, Y. & Yamato, T., 2007. "Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures," Discussion Paper 2007-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All full texts are decentralized with the publishers, none reside on this server, thus making it possible to offer this service for free to all parties.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-1.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.