Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents

Contents:

Author Info

  • P. Jean-Jacques Herings

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • Ana Mauleon

    ()
    (FNRS and CEREC, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
    FNRS and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 134 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • Vincent Vannetelbosch

    ()
    (FNRS and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 134 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/3/286/pdf
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/3/286/
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MDPI, Open Access Journal in its journal Games.

Volume (Year): 1 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 286-298

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:3:p:286-298:d:9473

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mdpi.com/

Related research

Keywords: coalition formation; farsighted players; stability;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, . "Farsightedly stable networks," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2171, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003. "Farsighted stability in hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 39-61, 08.
  3. MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, . "Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1729, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 0068, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  5. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2004. "Rationalizability for social environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 135-156, October.
  6. Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
  7. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
  8. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203]," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 355-356, December.
  9. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
  10. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
  11. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
  12. Mariotti, Marco, 1997. "A Model of Agreements in Strategic Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 196-217, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. A Bhattacharya & A Ziad, . "On Credible Coalitional Deviations by Prudent Players," Discussion Papers 09/33, Department of Economics, University of York.
  2. Alejandro Capparros & Eric Giraud-Heraud & Abdelhakim Hammoudi & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "Coalition stability with heterogeneous agents," Working Papers 41241, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  3. Boncinelli, Leonardo & Pin, Paolo, 2014. "Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation," MPRA Paper 56356, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. MAULEON, Ana & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, Jose & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2013. "Contractually stable alliances," CORE Discussion Papers 2013031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. MAULEON, Ana & MOLIS, Elena & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent & VERGOTE , Wouter, 2013. "Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2013052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:3:p:286-298:d:9473. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (XML Conversion Team).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.