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Marginal Contributions And Externalities In The Value

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  • Geoffroy de Clippel

    ()

  • Roberto Serrano

    ()

Abstract

For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the concepts of intrinsic marginal contributions and externalities. If one requires efficiency for the grand coalition, we provide several results concerning extensions of the Shapley value. Using the axioms of efficiency, anonymity, marginality and monotonicity, we provide upper and lower bounds to players' payoffs when affected by external effects, and a characterization of an ``externality-free'' value. If the grand coalition does not form, we characterize a payoff configuration on the basis of the principle of balanced contributions. We also analyze a game of coalition formation that yields sharp predictions

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we057339.

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Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we057339

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  1. Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1999-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
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  7. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2007. "Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 339-356, July.
  8. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
  9. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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  13. Pham Do, K.H. & Norde, H.W., 2002. "The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2002-4, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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  15. Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "Value Theory without Efficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 513, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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  19. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
  20. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
  21. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
  22. Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Value of Games in Partition Function Form," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 244, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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