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Coalition Formation

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013-1.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2013-1

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  2. James Andreoni & John Miller, 2002. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 737-753, March.
  3. Béal, Sylvain & Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe, 2008. "Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 303-313, November.
  4. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, . "Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games," Economics Working Papers, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus 2000-12, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  5. Armando Gomes & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 626-667, June.
  6. Zhao, Jingang, 1992. "The hybrid solutions of an N-person game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 145-160, January.
  7. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
  8. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
  9. Haeringer, Guillaume, 2004. "Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 140-143, July.
  10. Anindya Bhattacharya & Victoria Brosi, 2011. "An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 393-401, May.
  11. Philippe Aghion & Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, 2004. "Negotiating Free Trade," NBER Working Papers 10721, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
  13. Ana, MAULEON & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH & Wouter, VERGOTE, 2008. "Von Neuman-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques), Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques 2008013, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  14. CHANDER, Parkash, . "The gamma-core and coalition formation," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1993, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869, August.
  16. Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
  17. Francis Bloch & Santiago Sánchez-Pagés & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2006. "When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 3-29, 01.
  18. Gary Charness & Brit Grosskopf, 1999. "Relative payoffs and happiness: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 436, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2000.
  19. Bloch, Francis & Gomes, Armando, 2006. "Contracting with externalities and outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 172-201, March.
  20. Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Bargaining, coalitions and externalities: A comment on Maskin," Working Papers, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales 2008-11, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  21. Kyle Hyndman & Debraj Ray, 2007. "Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 1125-1147.
  22. David P�rez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
  23. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  24. Sang-Seung, Yi, 1996. "Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: open regionalism is good," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 153-177, August.
  25. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1972. "Cooperative games in effectiveness form," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 88-101, August.
  26. Seidmann, Daniel J., 2009. "Preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 143-159, September.
  27. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
  28. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  29. Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590 Elsevier.
  30. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
  31. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 987-1009.
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Cited by:
  1. Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers, Job Market Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.

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