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• Debraj Ray
• Garance Genicot

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Paper provided by Georgetown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number gueconwpa~04-04-03.

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Handle: RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~04-04-03

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment
O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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1. Thomas, Jonathan P. & Worrall, Tim, 2002. "Gift-Giving, Quasi-Credit and Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2000. "Gift-giving, Quasi-Credit and Reciprocity," Development and Comp Systems 0004005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Johnathan P. Thomas & Tim Worral, 2000. "Gift-giving, Quasi-Credit and Reciprocity," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 0005, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews. [Downloadable!]
   • Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2000. "Gift-giving, Quasi-Credit and Reciprocity," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2000/20, Department of Economics, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
2. Kocherlakota, Narayana R, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 68, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
   • Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 0068, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
   • Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
5. Udry, Christopher, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in Northern Nigeria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 495-526, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Fafchamps, Marcel & Lund, Susan, 2003. "Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Marcel Fafchamps & Susan Lund, 2000. "Risk-Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines," Economics Series Working Papers 010, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Marcel Fafchamps & Susan Lund, . "Risk Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines," Working Papers 97014, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," International Finance 0003004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Kletzer, Kenneth Miles, Jr. & Wright, Brian D., 1995. "Sovereign debt as intertemporal barter," CUDARE Working Paper Series 761, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
   • Kenneth M. Kletzer and Brian D. Wright., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-100, University of California at Berkeley.
   • Kenneth Kletzer & Brian Wright, 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series 1024, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
8. Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1999. "Are the poor less well insured? Evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 61-81, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1997. "Are the poor less well-insured? Evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1863, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
9. Posner, Richard A, 1980. "A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-53, April.
   Other versions:
   • Richard A. Posner, 1979. "A Theory of Primitive Society with Special Reference to Law," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 7, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
10. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Paul Gertler & Jonathan Gruber, 2002. "Insuring Consumption Against Illness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 51-70, March. [Downloadable!]
12. Kimball, Miles S, 1988. "Farmers' Cooperatives as Behavior Toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 224-32, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
16. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1992. "Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies: Rational Peasants with a Moral Economy," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 147-74, October.
17. Murgai, Rinku & Winters, Paul & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & Janvry, Alain de, 2002. "Localized and incomplete mutual insurance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 245-274, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-91, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Townsend, R.M., 1991. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 91-3, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
    • Robert M. Townsend, . "Risk and Insurance in Village India," University of Chicago - Population Research Center 91-3a, Chicago - Population Research Center.

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-15.