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Dynamic coalitional equilibrium

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  • Vartiainen, Hannu

Abstract

We study coalition formation processes of Konishi and Ray (2003) [27]. It is shown that an absorbing and deterministic process of coalition formation that also forms an equilibrium - satisfies a coalitional one-deviation property - does exist if one allows the process to be history dependent. All such dynamic equilibrium processes of coalition formation are characterized. Absorbing outcomes of dynamic equilibrium processes are also identified. It is shown that they always constitute a subset of the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994) [11]. A procedure that identifies a dynamic equilibrium process of coalition formation in finite time is constructed.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 146 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 672-698

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:2:p:672-698

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

Related research

Keywords: One-deviation principle Coalition formation History dependence;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J Seidmann, 2012. "Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda," Discussion Papers 2012-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Flesch J. & Kuipers J. & Schoenmakers G. & Vrieze K., 2011. "Subgame-Perfection in Free Transition Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

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