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Strongly Stable Networks

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Author Info
Matthew O. Jackson (jacksonm@hss.caltech.edu)
Anne van den Nouweland () (University of Oregon Economics Department)

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Abstract

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a "top convexity" condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be non-anonymous depending on player labels.

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File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2001-3_Jackson_Strongly_Stable.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2001-3.

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Length: 28
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2001
Date of revision: 15 Nov 2002
Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2001-3

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Postal: 1285 University of Oregon, 435 PLC, Eugene, OR 97403-1285
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "Network Formation with Sequential Demands," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 99/2, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2000. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jackson, Matthew O., 1998. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Working Papers 1044, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Mutuswami, S. & Winter, E., 2000. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Papers 2000/20, Universite catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics (CORE).
    Other versions:
  6. Bhaskar Dutta & Suresh Mutuswami, 1997. "Stable Networks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-039/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    Other versions:
  7. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Slikker, Marco & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2001. "A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 153-175, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Page, Frank Jr. & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2005. "Networks and farsighted stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 257-269, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marco A. Marini, 2007. "An Overview of Coalitions and Networks Formation Models for Economic Applications," Working Papers 0707, CREI Università degli Studi Roma Tre, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2003. "The role of trust in costly network formation," Discussion Paper 53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2007. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Caepr Working Papers 2007-020, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Alexander Elbittar & Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Muñoz, 2007. "Network Structure in a Link-formation Game: An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001708, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Sergio Currarini, 2006. "Network Design in Games with Spillovers," Working Papers 2006_16, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Francis Bloch & Matthew Jackson, 2006. "Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 305-318, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ana, MAULEON & JosŽ, SEMPERE-MONERRIS & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2005. "Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2005036, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jean-Jacques, HERINGS & Ana, MAULEON & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2006. "Farsightedly stable networks," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006046, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon Ana & Vannetelbosch Vincent, 2006. "Farsightedly Stable Networks," Research Memoranda 041, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  9. Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters Ronald, 2006. "Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory," Research Memoranda 046, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  10. Sudipta Sarangi & Robert P. Gilles, . "Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs," Departmental Working Papers 2005-13, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Vasileios Zikos, 2008. "R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly," Working Papers 2008.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  12. Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Muñoz, 2008. "Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 335-345, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert Gilles, 2007. "Network potentials," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 13-52, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Marco Marini, 2007. "An Overview of Coalition & Network Formation Models for Economic Applications," Working Papers 0712, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
  15. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency," Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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