Contractually Stable Networks
AbstractWe develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2009.47.
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Networks; Coalition Structures; Contractual Stability; Allocation Rules;
Other versions of this item:
- Jean-François Caulier & A. Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2013. "Contractually stable networks," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00633611, HAL.
- Jean-François, CAULIER & Ana, MAULEON & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2008. "Contractually stable networks," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2008045, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- CAULIER, Jean-François & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2008. "Contractually stable networks," CORE Discussion Papers 2008066, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean-Francois Caulier & Ana Mauleon & Vincent VAnnetelbosch, 2007. "Contractually Stable Networks," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000084, www.najecon.org.
- A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-07-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2009-07-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2009-07-28 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-07-28 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Taiji Furusawa & Hideo Konishi, 2003.
"Free Trade Networks,"
2003.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996.
"A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jean-Jacques HERINGS & Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2001.
"Rationalizability for Social Environments,"
Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales)
2001028, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2004. "Rationalizability for social environments," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12153, Maastricht University.
- HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & ANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., . "Rationalizability for social environments," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1718, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1996.
971, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005.
"Strongly stable networks,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "Strongly Stable Networks," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2001-3, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 15 Nov 2002.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Working Papers 1147, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Anne van den Nouweland, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Microeconomics 0211006, EconWPA.
- Ana, MAULEON & José, SEMPERE-MONERRIS & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2005.
"Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers,"
Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques)
2005036, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn.
- Goyal, S. & Joshi, S., 2000.
"Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly,"
Econometric Institute Report
EI 9952-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Econometric Institute.
- Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2000. "Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-092/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Sumit Joshi, 2000. "Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0623, Econometric Society.
- Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2006.
"Bilateralism And Free Trade,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(3), pages 749-778, 08.
- Sang-Seung, Yi, 1996. "Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: open regionalism is good," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 153-177, August.
- Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
- Ping Wang & Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of buyer-seller trade networks in a quality-differentiated product market," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 971-1004, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.