Strongly Stable Networks

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Strongly Stable Networks

Author Info

Matthew O. Jackson (California Institute of Technology)
Anne van den Nouweland (University of Oregon)

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Matthew O. Jackson

Abstract

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a ``top convexity'' condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be non- anonymous -- depending on player labels.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0211006.

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Date of creation: 04 Nov 2002
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211006

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Article
- Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005. "Strongly stable networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Matthew O. Jackson & Anne van den Nouweland, 2001. "Strongly Stable Networks," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2001-3, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 15 Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
- Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Working Papers 1147, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2002-11-10 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2002-11-10 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "Network Formation with Sequential Demands," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 99/2, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2000. [Downloadable!]
Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jackson, Matthew O., 1998. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Working Papers 1044, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 265-295, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
MUTUSWAMI, Suresh & WINTER, Eyal, 2000. "Subscription mechanisms for network formation," CORE Discussion Papers 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Suresh Mutuswami & Eyal Winter, 2001. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Discussion Paper Series dp264, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
- Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 242-264, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Bhaskar Dutta & Suresh Mutuswami, 1997. "Stable Networks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-039/1, Tinbergen Institute.
Other versions:
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1996. "Stable Networks," Working Papers 971, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1997. "Stable Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 322-344, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Slikker, Marco & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2001. "A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 153-175, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Slikker, M. & Nouweland, A. van den, 1997. "A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division," Discussion Paper 23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Page, Frank Jr. & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2005. "Networks and farsighted stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 257-269, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Samir Kamat & Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2004. "Networks and Farsighted Stability," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 561, Econometric Society.
- Page Jr. Frank H & Wooders, Myrna & Kamat, Samir, 2003. "Networks and Farsighted Stability," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 689, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Page Jr, Frank H & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2002. "Networks And Farsighted Stability," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 660, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Page Jr, Frank H & Wooders, Myrna H & Kamat, Samir, 2001. "Networks And Farsighted Stability," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 621, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Frank H. Page Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders & Samir Kamat, 2002. "Networks and Farsighted Stability," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 370, Society for Computational Economics.

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