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R&D network formation with myopic and farsighted firms

Author

Listed:
  • Mauleon, Ana
  • Sempere-Monerris, Jose J.
  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

Abstract

We study the formation of R&D networks when firms can be either myopic or farsighted.Stability leads to R&D networks consisting of either asymmetric components or nearly symmetric components. Farsighted firms have in average more collaborations but myopic firms can be central for spreading the innovation. We introduce yes-firms that form links subject to the constraint of non-negative profits. Yes-firms stabilize R&D networks that maximize social welfare. Finally, the evolution of R&D networks shows that nearly symmetric R&D networks will be rapidly dismantled, socially optimal R&D networks will persist many periods, while asymmetric R&D networks will persist forever.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauleon, Ana & Sempere-Monerris, Jose J. & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2023. "R&D network formation with myopic and farsighted firms," LIDAM Reprints CORE 3222, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:3222
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.02.012
    Note: In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2023, vol. 208, p. 203-229
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre de Callataÿ & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 405-422, April.
    2. Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald, 2021. "Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    3. Chenghong Luo & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2021. "Network formation with myopic and farsighted players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1283-1317, June.
    4. Ana Mauleon & Jose J. Sempere-Monerris & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Limited Farsightedness in R &D Network Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 549-565, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Networks ; R&D collaborations ; Oligopoly ; Myopia ; Farsightedness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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