Networks of knowledge among unionized firms

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Networks of knowledge among unionized firms

Author Info

Ana Mauleon
Jose J. Sempere-Monerris
Vincent Vannetelbosch

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Abstract

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 41 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 971-997
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:41:y:2008:i:3:p:971-997

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Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

Cited by:
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Vasileios Zikos, 2008. "R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly," Working Papers 2008.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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