Modelling Imperfectly Appropriable R&D via Spillovers
Abstract
We provide an extensive comparison of the R&D models of d'Aspremont-Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien-Muller-Zang (1992), exposing full or partial conflict in key conclusions and policy prescriptions. Using three separate formal and/or intuitive criteria, we argue that the first model is invalid for large spillover values. This conclusion is corroborated by an additional argument leading to equivalence between the two R&D processes, but not to agreement on some key conclusions. Hence, the models emerge as fundamentally different, although a unilateral shift in the cost function of the first leads to agreement in all equilibrium outcomes.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number 1998-07.Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: International Journal of Industrial Organization. October 2000; 18(7): 1013-32
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-07
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Related research
Keywords: oligopolistic R&D; spillovers; R&D cooperation; model validity;Other versions of this item:
- Amir, Rabah, 2000. "Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1013-1032, October.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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