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Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures

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Author Info

  • Salant, S.W.
  • Shaffer, G.

Abstract

This paper identies an overlooked implication of models of research joint ventures initiated by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Even though the a ggregate R&D cost of identical rms in a research joint venture would be lowest if they invested equally to re- duce subsequent production costs, nonetheless members may often enlarge their overall joint prot by making unequal investments.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory in its series Papers with number 97-06.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:michet:97-06

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.

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Keywords: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ; ENTERPRISES;

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References

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  1. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Varian, Hal R, 1985. "When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 715-18, October.
  2. Vonortas, Nicholas S., 1994. "Inter-firm cooperation with imperfectly appropriable research," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 413-435, September.
  3. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1991. "The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 767-92, November.
  4. De Bondt, Raymond & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1991. "Strategic investment with spillovers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 345-366, October.
  5. Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Competitive advantage and collusive optima," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-367.
  6. Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 1995. "Equilibrium and Optimal Size of a Research Joint Venture in an Oligopoly with Spillovers," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 209-26, June.
  7. Bergstrom, Theodore C. & Varian, Hal R., 1985. "Two remarks on Cournot equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 5-8.
  8. M. J. Farrell, 1959. "The Convexity Assumption in the Theory of Competitive Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67, pages 377.
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