Strategic R&D with Spillovers, Collusion and Welfare
AbstractThe author considers a two-stage R&D then output or price duopoly game in which R&D spills over, so reducing the marginal cost of both the investing firm and its rival. The author compares the noncooperative regime to three collusive regimes--joint venture (collusion on R&D), price fixing (collusion at the price or output stage), and merger (collusion at both stages)--and evaluates under what circumstances a collusive regime improves welfare. If spillovers are sufficiently large, all three regimes are beneficial, although mergers are more likely and price-fixing less likely to produce specific benefits than are joint ventures. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 42 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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