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Research Joint Ventures and Optimal R&D Policy with Asymmetric Information

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Author Info
Bruno Cassiman
Abstract

Research Joint Ventures and subsidies are important R&D policy instruments. The regulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there are appropriability problems is one such variable that is private information to the firms within the industry. In a duopoly setting we analyze the characteristics of a first-best and second-best R&D policy where the government can either allow Research Joint Ventures or not and give lump-sum subisides to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy improves upon the policy of an unsophisicated government by integrating reports of the firms on their spillovers and the correlation between the R&D spillovers of the firms into its formulation.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1105.

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Date of creation: Oct 1994
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1105

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  1. De Bondt, Raymond & Slaets, Patrick & Cassiman, Bruno, 1992. "The degree of spillovers and the number of rivals for maximum effective R &D," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 35-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. AURIOL, Emmanuelle & LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "Regulation by Duopoly," IDEI Working Papers 20, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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  3. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shapiro, Carl & Willig, Robert D, 1990. "On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 113-30, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Grossman, Gene M & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 315-37, Fall.
  6. Seade, Jesus, 1980. "The stability of cournot revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 15-27, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. De Bondt, Raymond & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1991. "Strategic investment with spillovers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 345-366, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Trond E. Olsen, 1993. "Regulation of Multiagent Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 529-541, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Veugelers, Reinhilde & Kesteloot, Katrien, 1994. "On the design of stable joint ventures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1799-1815, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Jorde, Thomas M & Teece, David J, 1990. "Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 75-96, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Richard C. Levin & Peter C. Reiss, 1988. "Cost-Reducing and Demand-Creating R&D with Spillovers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 538-556, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Michael L. Katz, 1986. "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 527-543, Winter.
  14. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 1989. "Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 538-552, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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