Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in Oligopoly with Spillovers

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kotaro Suzumura

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a218.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a218

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi City, Tokyo 186
Phone: +81-42-580-8327
Fax: +81-42-580-8333
Email:
Web page: http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca, 2009. "Dynamic R&D with spillovers: Competition vs cooperation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 568-582, March.
  2. Noriaki Matsushima & Koki Arai & Ikuo Ishibashi & Fumio Sensui, 2011. "The effects of non-assertion of patents provisions: R&D incentives in vertical relationships," ISER Discussion Paper 0807, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  3. E. Bacchiega & L. Lambertini & A. Mantovani, 2008. "R&D-hindering collusion," Working Papers 651, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  4. Roland Kirstein & Birgit Will, . "Efficient Compensation for Employees’ Inventions," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1080, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  5. Sanjeev Goyal & Alexander Konovalov & Jose Luis Moraga, 2003. "Hybrid R&D," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-041/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  6. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca & Sterlacchini, Alessandro, 2009. "Managerial incentive and the firms’ propensity to invest in product and process innovation," MPRA Paper 12935, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. L. Lambertini & G. Rossini, 2004. "The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers," Working Papers 508, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  8. TESORIERE, Antonio, 2005. "Endogenous R&D symmetry in linear duopoly with one-way spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers 2005045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Junichi Nishimura & Hiroyuki Okamuro, 2010. "R&D Productivity and the Organization of Cluster Policy: An Empirical Evaluation of the Industrial Cluster Project in Japan," DRUID Working Papers 10-06, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  10. Vincent Vannetelbosch & Ana Mauleon & José Sempere-Monerris, 2005. "R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms," Working Papers 2005.49, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  11. L. Lambertini, 2004. "Innovation and Managerial Incentives: A Tale of Two Systems," Working Papers 498, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  12. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2002. "Advertising with Spillover Effects in a Differential Oligopoly Game With Differentiated Goods," Working Papers 430, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a218. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hiromichi Miyake).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.