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Antitrust Policy towards Co-operative R&D Ventures

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  • Geroski, P A

Abstract

This paper surveys the theoretical literature on R&D cartels and the empirical literature on problems of appropriability in order to evaluate the case for encouraging antitrust authorities to treat R&D cooperative ventures leniently. The case for R&D cooperative ventures trades potential gains from internalizing technological spillovers off against a possible reduction in output market competition, but the empirical evidence suggests that R&D spillovers can easily be exaggerated. This suggests that the design of antitrust policy towards R&D cooperative ventures is likely to be of major importance if they are to yield net social gains, and the paper concludes with a critical examination of the NCRA introduced in U.S. and Block Exemption introduced in Europe in the 1980s. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 9 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 58-71

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:58-71

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Web page: http://oxrep.oupjournals.org/

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Cited by:
  1. Reka Horvath, 2001. "Cooperative research and firm performance," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0108, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  2. Bruno Cassiman, 1994. "Research Joint Ventures and Optimal R&D Policy with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 1105, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Kaiser, Ulrich, 2002. "Measuring knowledge spillovers in manufacturing and services: an empirical assessment of alternative approaches," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 125-144, January.
  4. Harabi, Najib, 1997. "Vertical Relations Between Firms and Innovation: An Empirical Investigation of German Firms," ZEW Discussion Papers 97-10, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  5. Lars Wiethaus, 2006. "Cooperation or competition in R&D when innovation and absorption are costly," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(6), pages 569-589.
  6. E. Bacchiega & L. Lambertini & A. Mantovani, 2008. "R&D-hindering collusion," Working Papers 651, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  7. Tao, Zhigang & Wu, Changqi, 1997. "On the organization of cooperative research and development: Theory and evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 573-596, August.
  8. Changqi Wu & K.C. Wei, 1998. "Cooperative R&D and the Value of the Firm," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 425-446, August.
  9. Najib Harabi, 2002. "The Impact of Vertical R&D Cooperation on Firm Innovation: An Empirical Investigation," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 93-108.

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