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Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions

In: Handbook of Industrial Organization

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Baron, David P.
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This chapter was published in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, , chapter 24, pages 1347-1447, 1989.

This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Industrial Organization with number 2-24.

Handle: RePEc:eee:indchp:2-24

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This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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L0 - Industrial Organization - - General

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