Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Strategic Investment with Asymmetric Spillovers

Contents:

Author Info

  • Raymond De Bondt
  • Irene Henriques
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper investigates the implications of asymmetric spillovers on noncooperative strategic investments in a duopoly with quadratic pay-offs. A unique equilibrium in the announcement of the leader/follower role exists in the case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other, at most, is able to receive only small spillovers. The leader in this equilibrium is the firm that absorbs the large spillovers. Other asymmetries in initial costs or efficiency in research and development do not affect this outcome.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199508%2928%3A3%3C656%3ASIWAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 28 (1995)
    Issue (Month): 3 (August)
    Pages: 656-74

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:3:p:656-74

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
    Email:
    Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Email:
    Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. De Bondt, Raymond, 1997. "Spillovers and innovative activities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-28, February.
    2. Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2005. "Are Intellectual Property Rights Detrimental to Innovation?," Staff General Research Papers 12267, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Kyung Hwan Baik & Todd Cherry & Stephan Kroll & Jason Shogren, 1999. "Endogenous Timing in a Gaming Tournament," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 1-21, August.
    4. Ofori, F., 2011. "Sources of International Economic Spillovers to Ghana's Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 30455, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Reinhilde Veugelers & Katrien Kesteloot, 1996. "Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the matthew effect catalyzing?," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 23-51, February.
    6. Ernesto Somma, . "The Effect of Incomplete Information about Future Technological Opportunities on Pre-Emption," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 95/41, Department of Economics, University of York.
    7. Aloysius, John A., 2002. "Research joint ventures: A cooperative game for competitors," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 591-602, February.
    8. Kaiser, Ulrich, 2002. "An empirical test of models explaining research expenditures and research cooperation: evidence for the German service sector," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 747-774, June.
    9. Das, Gouranga, 2000. "Absorptive capacity and structural congruence: the binding constraints on the acquisition of technology--an analytical survey of the underlying issues," MPRA Paper 37257, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Jan 2001.
    10. Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2003. "Following the Follower in the Innovation Game," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 216, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    11. Dirk Czarnitzki & Kornelius Kraft, 2012. "Spillovers of innovation activities and their profitability," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 302-322, April.
    12. Joseph Plasmans & Ruslan Lukatch, 2001. "Measuring Knowledge Spillovers Using Belgian EPO and USPTO Patent Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 430, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Silipo, Damiano B., 2008. "Incentives and forms of cooperation in research and development," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 101-119, June.
    14. SUETENS, Sigrid, 2004. "Literature review: R&D cooperation in oligopoly with spillovers: An experimental economics approach," Working Papers 2004024, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
    15. Marco Marini & Maria Luisa Petit & Roberta Sestini, 2012. "Strategic Timing in R&D Agreements," DIAG Technical Reports 2012-07, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    16. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2005:i:18:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:3:p:656-74. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.