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Incomplete Information and Optimal Market Structure: Public Purchases from Private Providers

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Author Info
Thomas G. McGuire ()
Michael H. Riordan ()

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Abstract

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Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 0010.

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Date of creation: Jun 1991
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Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:0010

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Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
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Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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  1. Bruno Cassiman, 1994. "Research Joint Ventures and Optimal R&D Policy with Asymmetric Information," Economics Working Papers 263, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1997. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bruno Cassiman, 1994. "Research Joint Ventures and Optimal R&D Policy with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 1105, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 142, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Evenett, Simon J & Hoekman, Bernard, 2003. "Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 4109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2000. "Implementing Efficient Market Structure," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0268, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 1999. "Procurement and Information Feedback," Research Papers in Economics 2000:2, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Emmanuelle Auriol, 1993. "Monopole ou duopole: l'effet de comparaison," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 31, pages 01, Juillet-S. [Downloadable!]
  8. AURIOL, Emmanuelle & PICARD, Pierre, 2004. "Liberal regulation : privatization of natural monopolies with adverse selection," CORE Discussion Papers 2004013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  9. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre, 2008. "Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly," IDEI Working Papers 382, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 2000. "In-House Competition, Organizational Slack and the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 2557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Martin K Perry & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Auctions for Split-Award Contracts," ESE Discussion Papers 90, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Yongmin Chen & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Market Design with Correlated Valuations," Working Papers 1034, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Asher Wolinsky, 1993. "Regulation of Duopoly Under Asymmetric Information: Prices VS Quantities," Discussion Papers 1061, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  14. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2000. "License Auctions and Market Structure," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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