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Regulation, Competition and Liberalization

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  • Mark Armstrong
  • David E.M. Sappington

Abstract

In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.

Volume (Year): 44 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 325-366

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:44:y:2006:i:2:p:325-366

Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.44.2.325
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