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Corruption and competition in procurement

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Author Info
Celentani, Marco
Ganuza, Juan-Jose

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-4607CFK-6/2/fa19d77eb7c441e04af3f690c40d0112
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 46 (2002)
Issue (Month): 7 (July)
Pages: 1273-1303
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:7:p:1273-1303

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Fernando Branco, 1997. "The Design of Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 63-81, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 1999. "Corruption and the Hadleyburg Effect," Economics Working Papers 382, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1987. "Asymmetric information in competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 153-156. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-37, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "Natural Openness and Good Government," NBER Working Papers 7765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2001. "Organized vs. Competitive Corruption," Economics Working Papers 526, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1986. "A note on competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 337-341. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Beck, Paul J. & Maher, Michael W., 1986. "A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-5. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Riordan, Michael H & Sappington, David E M, 1987. "Awarding Monopoly Franchises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 375-87, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-23, October.
  15. Banfield, Edward C, 1975. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 587-605, December.
  16. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1987. "Competition for Agency Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 296-307, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marco Celentani & Juan José Ganuza & José L. Peydró, 2003. "Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions," Economics Working Papers 670, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Susanne Büchner & Andreas Freytag & Luis G. Gonzalez & Werner Güth, 2006. "Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-30, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2005. "Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Frédéric Boehm, 2005. "Corrupción y captura en la regulación de los servicios públicos," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 7(13), pages 245-263, July-Dece. [Downloadable!]
  5. Roberto Burguet & Martin Perry, 2007. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1219-1219. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2001. "Organized vs. Competitive Corruption," Economics Working Papers 526, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]
  7. Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortman & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption And Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Reiss, J. Philipp & Schöndube Jens Robert, 2007. "First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model," Research Memoranda 003, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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