This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Competition for Agency Contracts

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
R. Preston McAfee
John McMillan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This article introduces a market for the services of agents into a principal-agent model. The principal and the potential agents are risk neutral. The contract trades off adverse selection against moral hazard. In a broad range of circumstances the optimal contract is linear in the outcome. In an incentive-compatible contract the more able is an agent, the larger is his contractual share of his marginal output; thus, a more able agent is induced to work at a rate closer to the first-best.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28198722%2918%3A2%3C296%3ACFAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 296-307
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:summer:p:296-307

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2008. "Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors," Discussion Papers 237, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Galal, Ahmed & Nauriyal, Bharat, 1995. "Regulating telecommunications in developing countries : outcomes, incentives, and commitment," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1520, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sander Onderstal & Pierre Koning, 2004. "Auctioning incentive contracts: application to welfare-to-work programs," CPB Discussion Papers 38, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jose E. Quintero Jaramillo, 2004. "Liquidity Constraints And Credit Subsidies In Auctions," Business Economics Working Papers wb040604, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa. [Downloadable!]
  5. Leopold Soegner, 1998. "Regulation of a Complementary Imputed Good in a Competitive Environment," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp056, Vienna University of Economics and B.A., Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  7. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Manuel Santos & Jorge Aseff, . "Stock Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts," Working Papers 2133304, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, 2000. "Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 944-960, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. William P. Rogerson, 2003. "Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 919-926, June. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hai Wang & Weidong Zhang & Jingjing Wang, 2007. "Auctioning the state owned enterprise in China: the trade-off between maximizing revenue and minimizing unemployment," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 267-280, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. William Novshek & Lynda Thoman, 1993. "Agency in a market setting," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 225-253, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000. "Corruption and Competition in Procurement," Economics Working Papers 464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 197-249, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. François MARECHAL, 2003. "Should we base procurement rules on the competition of linear incentive contracts ?," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
  16. D. K"Ubler, . "Auctioning Off Labor Contracts: Legal Restrictions Reconsidered," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-22, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  17. Joel Sobel, 1996. "Bean Counting: Standard Choice in a Two-Dimensional Incentive Problem," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 96-20, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  18. Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard & Salanié, François, 2001. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 131, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Gould, Eric D & Pashigian, B. Peter & Prendergast, Canice, 2002. "Contracts, Externalities and Incentives in Shopping Malls," CEPR Discussion Papers 3598, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. D. K"Ubler, . "General Training and Information Costs: Who Benefits from Flexible Workers?," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-23, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  21. Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design," NBER Working Papers 10891, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Tracy R. Lewis & Huseyin Yildirim, 2002. "Managing Dynamic Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 779-797, September. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over five million full texts a year are downloaded through IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.