Corruption and the Hadleyburg effect
AbstractWe study the dynamics of corruption relying on two fundamental observations: (a) Given agents detected as corrupt are typically fired and replaced, the historical levels of corruption have an impact on current corruption through the distribution of corruption costs of old agents; (b) Institutions negatively affected by their agents' corrupt activities are likely to respond optimally to it thereby decreasing the payoff from being corrupt. We model this situation by considering an agent who is supposed to monitor a contractor's delivery of a product or service and can manipulate his reports thus allowing the contractor to deliver lower quality in exchange for a bribe. Given the two generations of agents overlapping at any particular date, the administration sets an optimal level of quality in each period. We find that (i) A unique steady state level of corruption exists; (ii) Regardless of the initial distribution, apart from an initial period, equilibrium sequences are decreasing and converge to the steady state, a result we term the "Hadleyburg effect". We use these findings to study the dynamic response of corruption to both temporary and permanent shocks to the profitability of corruption and we find that the "Hadleyburg effect" has important positive and normative implications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 382.
Date of creation: Apr 1999
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-07-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAB-1999-07-28 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-1999-07-28 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-1999-07-28 (Microeconomics)
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- Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002.
"Corruption and competition in procurement,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
- Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2001. "Organized vs. competitive corruption," Economics Working Papers 526, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2001.
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