AbstractIn a multistage model of defense procurement we show that a second source of production is often of limited value. In many instances, second sourcing will result in strictly less expected welfare than is generated by sole sourcing.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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- William P. Rogerson, 1993. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1078, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dalen, D.M. & von der Fehr, N.-H.M. & Moen, E.R., 1998. "Regulation and Wage Bargaining," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 13/1998, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Thomas G. McGuire & Michael H. Riordan, 1991.
"Incomplete Information and Optimal Market Structure: Public Purchases from Private Providers,"
Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme
0010, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- McGuire, Thomas G. & Riordan, Michael H., 1995. "Incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 125-141, January.
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