Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

For technical questions regarding this series, please contact (Thomas Krichel)
Series handle: repec:fth:bostin

• 0102 Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency
  by Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma
• 0101 Risk Selection and Matching in Performance-Based Contracting
  by Mingshan Lu & Ching-to Albert Ma & Lasheng Yuan
• 0100 Competition Policy as Strategic Trade
  by Mark Rysman
• 0099 Using Diagnoses to Describe Populations and Predict Costs
  by Arlene Ash & Randall P. Ellis & Gregory Pope & John Ayanian & David Bates & Helen Burstin & Lisa Iezzoni & Elizabeth McKay & Wei Yu
• 0098 Can Asymetric Information Solve Puzzles From The Reemployment Bonus Experiments?
  by Nuria Rodriguez-Planas

• 0097 Cost-Minimizing Risk Adjustment
  by Yujing Shen & Randall P. Ellis
• 0096 Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form
  by Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini

• 88 Using the Diagnostic Cost Group (DCG) Model to Measure Risk Selection in the Massachusetts State Employee Health Insurance Program
  by Yu, W. & Ellis, R.P. & Ash, A.
• 85 Dollars and Performance : Cost Effectiveness of Substance Abuse Treatment in Maine
  by Machado, M.P.
• 0095 The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions
  by Zvika Neeman
• 0094 Network Incentives in Managed Health Care
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & Thomas G. McGuire
• 0093 The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design
  by Zvika Neeman
• 0092 Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders
  by Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel
• 0091 Environmental Regulation and Productivity: Evidence from Oil Refineries
  by Eli Berman & Linda T.M. Bui
• 0090 Violence and the U.S. Prohibition of Drugs and Alcohol
  by Jeffrey A. Miron
• 0089 Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion
  by Ingela Brundin & Ching-to Albert Ma
• 0088 Using the Diagnostic Cost Group (DCG) Model to Measure Risk Selection in the Massachusetts State Employee Health Insurance Program
  by Wei Yu & Randall P. Ellis & Arlene Ash
• 87 A Tax Proposal to Smooth Business Cycles, Encourage Investment and Remove Biases Against Small Firms
  by Weiss, A.
• 86 Playing Hard to Get: Theory and Evidence on Layoffs, Recalls and Unemployment
  by Rodriguez-Planas, N.
• 0085 Dollars and Performance: Cost Effectiveness of Substance Abuse Treatment in Maine
  by Matilde Pinto Machado
• 84 Cost and Quantity Invcentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers
  by Albert Ma, C.T.
• 0087 The Fair Tax: A Tax Proposal to Smooth Business Cycles, Encourage Investment and Remove Biases Against Small Firms
  by Andrew Weiss
• 0086 Playing Hard to Get: Theory and Evidence on Layoffs, Recalls and Unemployment
  by Nuria Rodriguez-Planas

• 83 Termination and Coordination in Partnerships
  by Minehart, D. & Neeman, Z.
• 82 Environmental Regulation and Labor demand: Evidence from the South Coast Air Basin
  by Berman, E. & Bui, L.T.
• 0084 Cost and Quality Incentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers
  by Ching-to Albert Ma
• 0083 Termination and Coordination in Partnerships
  by Deborah Minehart & Zvika Neeman
• 0082 Environmental Regulation and Labor Demand: Evidence from the South Coast Air Basin
  by Eli Berman & Linda T. Bui
• 81 Costs and Incentives in a Mental Health and Substance Abuse Carve Out
  by Albert Ma, C.T. & McGuire, T.G.
• 0080 Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Riordan
• 0079 Solving Unit Commitment by a Unit Decommitment Method
  by Chung-Li Tseng & Chao-an Li & Shmuel S. Oren
• 0078 The Effects of Alcohol Prohibition on Alcohol Consumption
  by Jeffrey A. Miron
• 0077 On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions
  by Maria Angeles de Frutos & Robert W. Rosenthal
• 0076 Balladurette and Juppette: A Discrete Analysis of Scrapping Subsidies
  by Jerome Adda & Russell Cooper
• 0074 Financial Distress, Bank Debt Restructurings, and Layoffs: Theory and Evidence
  by A. Jorge Padilla & Alejandro Requejo
• 0081 Cost and Incentives in a Mental Health and Substance Abuse Carve Out
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & Thomas G. McGuire

• 75 Competition and Incentives with Non-Exclusive Contracts
  by Kahn, C.M. & Mookherjee, D.
• 71 Budgeting and Hierarchical Control
  by Mookherjee, D. & Reichelstein, S.
• 70 Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation
  by Melamad, N. & Mookherjee, D. & Reichelstein, S.
• 69 Some Estimates of Annual Alcohol Consumption Per Capita, 1870-1991
  by Miron, J.A.
• 68 A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure
  by Ray, D. & Vohra, R.
• 64 Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm
  by Riordan, M.H.
• 0075 Competition and Incentives with Non-Exclusive Contracts
  by Charles M. Kahn & Dilip Mookherjee
• 74 Financial Distress, Bank Debt Restructurings, and Layoffs: Theory and Evidence
  by Padilla, A.J. & Requejo, A.
• 73 Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device
  by Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M.
• 72 A Theory of Union Power and Labor Turnover
  by Kuhn, K.U. & Padilla, A.J.
• 0071 Budgeting and Hierarchical Control
  by Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein
• 0070 Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation
  by Nahum Melamad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein
• 0069 Some Estimates of Annual Alcohol Consumption Per Capita, 1870-1991
  by Jeffrey A. Miron
• 0068 A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure
  by Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra
• 67 Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm
  by Biglaiser, G. & Ma, C.A.
• 66 Health Premium Payment Systems for State Employees
  by Ellis, R.P.
• 65 Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability
  by Gale, D. & Rosental, R.W.
• 0064 Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm
  by Michael Riordan
• 0063 Capacity Constraint and Monopoly Regulation under Asymmetric Information
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & Clemencia Torres
• 0073 Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device
  by A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano
• 0072 A Theory of Union Power and Labor Turnover
  by Kai-Uwe Kuhn & A. Jorge Padilla
• 0067 Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm
  by Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma
• 0066 Health Premium Payment Systems for State Employees
  by Randall P. Ellis
• 0065 Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability
  by Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal

• 0062 Machine Replacement and the Business Cycle: Lumps and Bumps
  by Russell Cooper & John Haltiwanger & Laura Power
• 0061 Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure
  by Ching-to Albert Ma
• 0060 Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values
  by Robert W. Rosenthal & Ruqu Wang
• 0059 Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & Thomas G. McGuire
• 0058 Ex Post Regret and the Decentralized Sharing of Information
  by Deborah Minehart & Suzanne Scotchmer
• 0057 Predation with a Learning Curve
  by Luis M.B. Cabral & Michael H. Riordan
• 0056 Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies
  by Vijay Krishna & Robert Rosenthal
• 0055 Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry
  by Stephen G. Donald & David E.M. Sappington

• 0054 The Robustness of a Sophisticated Mutant in an Evolutionary Model of Cooperation
  by Erwin Amann & Chun Chun-Lei Yang
• 0053 Evolution of Cooperation with a Knowledgeable Mutant
  by Chun Chun-Lei Yang
• 0052 On theRate of Convergence of Continuous-Time Fictitious Play
  by Christopher Harris
• 0051 Exclusion and Integration in the Market for Video Programming Delivered to the Home
  by Michael H. Riordan & David J. Salant
• 0050 Hospital Response to Prospective Payment: Moral Hazard, Selection, and Practice-Style Effects
  by Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire
• 0049 Market Fragility and Guarantee Funds: Fundamental and Strategic Uncertainty
  by Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross
• 0048 Noncontractible Inputs and Health Insurance-Payment Systems
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & Thomas G. McGuire
• 0047 Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives
  by Ching-to Albert Ma
• 46 Equilibria and Pareto Optima of Markets with Adverse Effects
  by Gale, D.
• 45 On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitment by Monopolists
  by Chen, Y. & Rosenthal, R.W.
• 0046 Equilibria and Pareto Optima of Markets with Adverse Selection
  by Douglas Gale
• 0045 On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitments by Monopolists
  by Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal

• 43 Contracting for Community-Based Public Mental Health Services
  by McGuire, T.G. & Riordan, M.H.
• 40 Regulating a Dominant Firm : Quality, Private Informatio, and Industry Structure
  by Biglaiser, G. & Ma, C.T.A.
• 44 Generalized Solutions of Stochastic Differential Games in One Dimension
  by Harris, C.
• 0043 Contracting for Community-Based Public Mental Health Services
  by Thomas McGuire & Michael Riordan
• 42 Asking Prices as Commitment Devices
  by Chen, Y. & Rosenthal, R.W.
• 41 Regulation without Commitment: Price Regulation of UK Utilities (with Special Emphasis on Telecommunications)
  by Spiller, P.T. & Vogelsang, I.
• 0040 Regulating a Dominant Firm: Quality, Private Information, and Industry Structure
  by Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma
• 0044 Generalized Solutions of Stochastic Differential Games in One Dimension
  by Christopher Harris
• 0042 Asking Prices as Commitment Devices
  by Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal
• 0041 Regulation Without Commitment: Price Regulation of UK Utilities
  by Pablo T. Spiller & Ingo Vogelsang

• 39 The Learning Curve, Market Dominance and Predatory Pricing
  by Cabral, L. & Riordan, M.
• 38 Informational Capacity and Financal Collapse
  by Gale, D.
• 37 Dynamic Duopoly with Slowly Changing Customer Loyalties
  by Chen, Y. & Rosenthal, R.W.
• 36 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games
  by Cooper, R. & DeJong, D.W. & Ross, T.W.
• 0039 The Learning Curve, Market Dominance and Predatory Pricing
  by Luis M.B. Cabral & Michael Riordan
• 0038 Informational Capacity and Financial Collapse
  by Douglas Gale
• 0037 Dynamic Duopoly with Slowly Changing Customer Loyalties
  by Yongmin Chen & Robert W. Rosenthal
• 0036 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games
  by Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Thomas W. Ross
• 0035 Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods
  by Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal
• 0034 Rules of Thumb in Games
  by Robert W. Rosenthal
• 0033 Bargaining Rules of Thumb
  by Robert W. Rosenthal
• 0032 Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games
  by Wolfgang Leininger & Chun-Lei Yang
• 0031 On the Scope of Indirect Regulation of Monopolies in the Presence of Large Entry Cost
  by Michael Drottboom & Wolfgang Leininger
• 0030 Preemptive Adoptions of an Emerging Technology
  by Michael Riordan & David Salant
• 0028 Autos and the National Industrial Recovery Act: Evidence on Industry Complementarities
  by Russell Cooper & John Haltiwanger
• 0027 Regulating Complementary Products: A Problem of Institutional Choice
  by Richard J. Gilbert & Michael H. Riordan
• 0026 Competition and Bank Performance: A Theoretical Perspective
  by Michael H. Riordan
• 0025 Qualified Suppliers
  by Michael H. Riordan
• 0024 Quality Competition, Welfare, and Regulation
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & James F. Burgess Jr.
• 0023 Paying for Joint Costs in Health Care
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & Thomas G. McGuire

• 0029 Hospital Cost Function Estimation When Firms May Not Try to Minimize Total Costs
  by Randall Randall P. Ellis
• 0022 BANK RUNS: Liquidity and Incentives
  by Russell Cooper & Thomas Ross
• 0021 Are Adjustment Costs for Labor Asymmetric? An Econometric Test on Panel Data for Italy
  by Fidel Jaramillo & Fabio Schiantarelli & Alessandro Sembenelli
• 0020 The Economics of Referrals
  by Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire
• 0019 Workplace Drug Abuse Policy
  by Thomas G. McGuire & Christopher J. Ruhm
• 0018 Regulation and Preemptive Technology Adoption
  by Michael H. Riordan
• 0017 Learning to Compete and Vice Versa
  by Luis M.B. Cabral & Michael H. Riordan
• 0016 Variable Markups in a Model with Adjustment Costs: Econometric Evidence for U.S. Industry
  by Marzio Galeotti & Fabio Schiantarelli
• 0015 Physician Response to Fee Changes with Multiple Payers
  by Thomas G. McGuire & Mark V. Pauly
• 0014 Regulation, Quality Competition, and Price in the Hospital Industry
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & James F. Burgess Jr.
• 0013 Delivery Lags, Adjustment Costs, and Econometric Investment Models
  by Robert S. Chirinko & Fabio Schiantarelli
• 0011 A Cross Country Comparison of Seasonal Cycles and Business Cycles
  by J. Joseph Beaulieu & Jeffrey A. Miron
• 0010 Incomplete Information and Optimal Market Structure: Public Purchases from Private Providers
  by Thomas G. McGuire & Michael H. Riordan
• 0009 Mental Health Provider Response to the Reimbursement System
  by Brooke S. Harrow & Randall P. Ellis
• 0008 Medicare Payment to Psychiatric Facilities: Unfair and Inefficient?
  by Jerry Cromwell & Brooke Harrow & Thomas G. McGuire & Randall P. Ellis
• 0007 Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
  by Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Manove
• 0006 The Demand for Outpatient Medical Care in Rural Kenya
  by Randall P. Ellis & Germano M. Mwabu

• 0012 The Seasonal Cycle in U.S. Manufacturing
  by J. Joseph Beaulieu & Jeffrey A. Miron
• 0005 Should Physicians Be Permitted to 'Balance Bill' Patients
  by Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire
• 0004 Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
  by Ching-to Albert Ma
• 0003 Optimal Risk Sharing Through Renegotiation of Simple Contracts
  by Douglas Gale
• 0002 Regulation and Preemptive Technology Adoption: Cable TV versus Telephone Companies
  by Michael H. Riordan
• 0001 Macroeconomic Implications of Production Bunching: Factor Demand Linkages
  by Russell Cooper & John Haltiwanger

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This page was last updated on 2009-6-13.