Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm
AbstractWe study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regulator cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed. We characterize the regulated incumbent's incentive to invest when a deregulation process is initiated and an unregulated firm enters the market as a result.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 67.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
More information through EDIRC
INVESTMENTS; ENTERPRISES; DEREGULATION;
Other versions of this item:
- Biglaiser, Gary & Ma, Ching-To Albert, 1999. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 215-35, November.
- Biglaiser, G. & Ma, C.T.A., 1996. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 340.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma, 1996. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," Papers 0067, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Debande, Olivier, 2001. "Deregulating and privatizing statutory monopolies," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 111-137.
- Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2004. "Public rationing and private cost incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 333-352, January.
- repec:mop:credwp:05.07.59 is not listed on IDEAS
- João Vareda, 2007.
"Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction,"
31, Portuguese Competition Authority.
- Vareda, João, 2007. "Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp526, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.