We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regulator cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed. We characterize the regulated incumbent's incentive to invest when a deregulation process is initiated and an unregulated firm enters the market as a result.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number
67.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - General
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)