Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm

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Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm

Author Info

Biglaiser, G.
Ma, C.A.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Ching-to Albert Ma

Abstract

We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regulator cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed. We characterize the regulated incumbent's incentive to invest when a deregulation process is initiated and an unregulated firm enters the market as a result.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 67.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:67

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
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Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Biglaiser, Gary & Ma, Ching-To Albert, 1999. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 215-35, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Biglaiser, G. & Ma, C.T.A., 1996. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 340.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma, 1996. "Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm," Papers 0067, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Vareda, João, 2007. "Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp526, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
repec:mop:credwp:05.07.59 is not listed on IDEAS
João Vareda, 2007. "Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction," Working Papers 31, Portuguese Competition Authority. [Downloadable!]

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