On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 0077.
Date of creation: Jun 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Angeles de Frutos, Maria & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1998. "On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 201-221, May.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1998.
"Prices and the Winners Curse,"
Economics Series Working Papers
1998-W02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2000. "First Impressions in a Sequential Auction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1705, Econometric Society.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2010.
"Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 150-82, February.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2005. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers," ISER Discussion Paper 0645, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- S. Meij & L.-F. Pau, 2006.
"Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages,"
Society for Computational Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 395-430, May.
- Meij, S. & Pau, L-F. & van Heck, H.W.G.M., 2003. "Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2003-006-LIS, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
- Mezzetti, Claudio & Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa & Tsetlin, Ilia, 2008.
"Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 591-609, March.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Aleksandar Pekec & Ilia Tsetlin, 2005. "Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions," Discussion Papers in Economics 05/26, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2007.
- Claudio Mezzetti & Aleksandar Pekec & Ilia Tsetlin, 2004. "Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions," Working Papers 2004.147, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2003.
"Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0580, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Juan-José Ganuza, 2003. "Ignorance Promotes Competition: an Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations," Working Papers 107, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.