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On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions

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Author Info
Maria Angeles de Frutos
Robert W. Rosenthal ()

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 0077.

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Date of creation: Jun 1997
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Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:0077

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Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
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Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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  1. Masaki Aoyagi, 2005. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers," ISER Discussion Paper 0645, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2000. "First Impressions in a Sequential Auction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1705, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. S. Meij & L.-F. Pau, 2006. "Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 395-430, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Meij, S. & Pau, L-F. & Heck, H.W.G.M. van, 2003. "Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages," Research Paper ERS-2003-006-LIS Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
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